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ethical challenge”. Veterinarians are involved in animal research, not only as researcher and animal welfare
officers, but also as members of ethical review committees and as such require a unique set of skills to
provide a wide range of services and practices. Animal research in Europe is strictly regulated. The
harm-benefit analysis (HBA) is one of the legal corner stones in project authorization and as such has
to be carried out within a specific legal framework. Hence, veterinarians (and other members of ethical
review committees) require an understanding of the normative foundation of animal research legislation
in order to fulfill their role and responsibilities. Against this background, it is the goal of this article (1)
to introduce the rationale and role of the harm concept and the HBA in project evaluation of animal
research. (2) We then outline the different harm concepts which the European and the Swiss legislation
are based on and (3) elaborate on the moral significance that is given to different forms of harm within
the HBA in these legal frameworks. (4) Last, we demonstrate potential practical implications of these
conceptually different normative frameworks for project evaluation in animal research with the practical
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Summary Meeting the professional responsibilities of veterinarians in animal research has 
been described by the German Federal Chamber of Veterinary Surgeons (Bundes-
tierärztekammer, BTK) as a “special ethical challenge”. Veterinarians are involved 
in animal research, not only as researcher and animal welfare officers, but also as 
members of ethical review committees and as such require a unique set of skills 
to provide a wide range of services and practices.
Animal research in Europe is strictly regulated. The harm-benefit analysis (HBA) 
is one of the legal corner stones in project authorization and as such has to be 
carried out within a specific legal framework. Hence, veterinarians (and other 
members of ethical review committees) require an understanding of the norma-
tive foundation of animal research legislation in order to fulfill their role and 
responsibilities.
Against this background, it is the goal of this article (1) to introduce the ration-
ale and role of the harm concept and the HBA in project evaluation of animal 
research. (2) We then outline the different harm concepts which the European 
and the Swiss legislation are based on and (3) elaborate on the moral significance 
that is given to different forms of harm within the HBA in these legal frameworks. 
(4) Last, we demonstrate potential practical implications of these conceptually 
different normative frameworks for project evaluation in animal research with the 
practical example of genetically disenhancing the ability of rodents to feel pain 
and to suffer.
Keywords: Animal research regulation, harm-benefit analysis, regulatory ethics, 
animal research ethics, (non-)sentientism 
Zusammenfassung Die Erfüllung der verschiedenen beruflichen Verantwortungen von Tierärzten 
in der Tierversuchsforschung wurde von der Bundestierärztekammer (BTK) als 
„besondere ethische Herausforderung“ bezeichnet. Denn Tierärzte sind in der 
Tierversuchsforschung nicht nur als Forscher und Tierschutzbeauftragte involviert, 
sondern auch als Mitglieder von Ethikkommissionen und benötigen daher eine 
Vielzahl von Fähigkeiten, um eine breite Palette von Dienstleistungen ausführen 
zu können.
Tierversuche sind in Europa strikte reguliert und die Schaden-Nutzen-Analyse 
(SNA) als einer der rechtlichen Eckpfeiler der Projektgenehmigung muss inner-
halb eines bestimmten, vorgegebenen rechtlichen Rahmens durchgeführt wer-
den. Tierärzte (und andere Mitglieder von Ethikkommissionen) benötigen daher 
ein Verständnis der normativen Grundlagen der Tierversuchsgesetzgebung, um 
ihre Rolle und Verantwortung adäquat erfüllen zu können.
Vor diesem Hintergrund ist es das Ziel dieses Artikels, (1) die Grundlage und 
Funktion des Schadenskonzepts und der SNA bei der Projektevaluierung zu 
erläutern. (2) Des Weiteren skizzieren wir die verschiedenen Schadenskonzepte, 
auf denen die europäische und die schweizerische Gesetzgebung basieren, und 
(3) diskutieren die moralische Bedeutung, die innerhalb dieser unterschiedlichen 
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rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen den verschiedenen Arten von Belastungen in 
einer SNA beigemessen wird. (4) Zuletzt zeigen wir mögliche praktische Implika-
tionen dieser konzeptionell unterschiedlichen normativen Rahmenbedingungen 
für die Projektevaluierung am praktischen Beispiel des genetic disenhancements 
bei Nagetieren zur Verminderung der Fähigkeit, Schmerzen zu fühlen und leiden 
zu können.
Schlüsselwörter: Tierversuchsregulierung, Schaden-Nutzen-Analyse, regulato-
rische Ethik, Ethik des Tierversuchs, (Non-)Sentientismus
Background
Veterinarians require a unique set of skills to provide a 
wide range of services and practices within the field of 
animal research for industrial, academic or official pur-
poses. The care and keeping of laboratory animals or the 
experimentation, respectively, can include standard vet-
erinary routines such as castration, vasectomy, immuni-
zation, sample collection, analgesia, anaesthesia as well 
as demanding surgeries, cryopreservation and assisted 
reproduction, which require special training. 
The role of veterinarians in animal research has recently 
been legally strengthened by Article 25 of the Euro-
pean Directive 2010/63/EU (Anonymous 2013, henceforth 
‘Directive’) which states, that “each breeder, supplier and 
user has a designated veterinarian with expertise in labo-
ratory animal medicine.” However, meeting the profes-
sional responsibilities of veterinarians in animal research 
has been described by the German Federal Chamber of 
Veterinary Surgeons (Bundestierärztekammer, BTK) as a 
“special ethical challenge” (Bundestierärztekammer 2017). 
One major challenge lies in the conflict between particu-
lar health-endangering or lethal practices for the involved 
animals and the veterinary professional code of conduct 
to prevent, relieve and cure animal diseases. The role of 
veterinarians as animal advocates, although from a his-
torical point of view being a young phenomenon (Weich 
2018), combined with the recent increase in moral stand-
ing of animals within society exacerbate this conflict. 
The moral justification of using animals within sci-
entific research (for the benefit to others) requires a 
specific moral theory, which in the case of the European 
Directive and Swiss Welfare Act can be found within the 
utilitarian tradition. The utilitarian paradigm is a per-
fectionist approach that tries to maximize the amount 
of pleasure (or interests’ satisfaction) and to minimize 
the amount of pain (or interests’ frustration) in the 
world. On this account, the justification of animal use 
in research requires a harm-benefit analysis, to justify 
the stress inflicted on animals by outweighing ben-
efits (Bundestierärztekammer 2017). Having specialised 
knowledge about animal welfare and being involved in 
animal experimentation itself (preparing and performing 
experiments) and project evaluation (i.e. authorization in 
ethical review bodies), veterinarians play a crucial role in 
optimizing this process.
The utilitarian paradigm is compatible with profes-
sional ethics in veterinary medicine for at least two rea-
sons. First of all, it seems to be the perfect compromise 
between respecting the moral status of sentient animals 
as well as regarding their individual interests, while still 
maintaining the possibility to use animals in research 
(i.e. by trumping their interests to achieve the “great-
est good for the greatest number”). Second, it complies 
with most contemporary legal regulations, which play a 
crucial role for daily veterinary practice. 
Nevertheless, the utilitarian paradigm should not be 
taken for granted. Animal rights theory, virtue ethics and 
contractarianism, the claim for stress limitation within 
contemporary legal frameworks (Rippe 2009, Binder 
2015) or the total ban of using great apes and gibbons for 
animal experimentation as stated in the Austrian Animal 
Experiments Act (2012, §4, no. 5, lit. a) contrast the utili-
tarian tradition. Also, the subjective harm-concept that 
is presumed within utilitarianism, is not self-evident, but 
can be challenged by objective harm-frameworks (we 
elaborate on this below). 
Importantly, the utilitarian framework of animal 
research is similar to the ethical framework applied in 
public health and agriculture but very different to ethical 
frameworks applied in veterinary practice of companion 
animals.
These dissents in moral theory and normative conflicts 
within the veterinary profession together with potential 
discrepancies between the veterinary professional code 
of conduct, personal moral convictions and given legal 
regulations make animal research very challenging for 
veterinarians. As members of ethical review committees, 
as animal welfare officers, or experimenters they are 
involved in very different roles with different responsi-
bilities in animal research. Based on these challenges, 
we assume for the following, that knowledge and clarity 
regarding conceptual normative frameworks of the legal 
regulations in animal research and specific roles and 
responsibilities arising therefrom for veterinarians are 
useful to reduce moral distress. 
To this end, we explain what moral theories and harm 
concepts the EU and Swiss regulation are based on and 
what practical implications follow from them.
Rationale and role of the harm concept 
and the HBA in project evaluation of 
animal research
In the following we explain the role and rationale behind 
animal research regulations in the EU and in Switzer-
land and elaborate what ethical frameworks they are 
based on. Ethical frameworks and principles (e.g. moral 
standing and harm concepts) may vary within different 
contexts of veterinary profession such as small animal 
clinic, livestock breeding, wildlife conservation or pub-
lic health and thus, conceptual clarity represents a key 
challenge for veterinarians, professional veterinary eth-
ics and what it means to be a good veterinarian in every 
field of veterinary medicine. In light of this, we think that 
our considerations regarding animal research should 
also be useful in other veterinary contexts.
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The European Directive on the protection of animals 
used for scientific purposes demands that the intrinsic 
value of animals is respected and states that animal 
welfare is a value that is enshrined in the Treaty of the 
Functioning of the European Union (recital 2, 12). Simi-
larly, the Swiss Animal Welfare Act (Tierschutzgesetz, 
henceforth: TSchG [Anonymous 2017]) also acknowl-
edges that animals have a value of their own that has to 
be respected and that the well-being and the dignity of 
animals has to be protected (art. 1 TSchG). 
Because of this, both the Swiss regulation and the 
Directive require project proposals in EU member states 
involving procedures on sentient animals to be approved 
in a review process (art. 38, Directive). For the Direc-
tive, this includes all living non-human vertebrates and 
cephalopods (art. 1, par. 3 lit. a, b Directive), while the 
Swiss legislation also includes decapods (art. 112, lit. a–d 
Swiss Animal Protection Ordinance; hereinafter: TSchV 
[Anonymous 2020]). Hence, in both, the Swiss and EU 
legislations project evaluation is only warranted if sen-
tient animals are used for research purposes. 
The review process of projects involving sentient ani-
mals can be divided into the evaluation of the instru-
mental and goal-related essentiality of a project pro-
posal (Swiss Academies of Arts and Sciences 2017, art. 
38 Directive). The instrumental essentiality evaluates 
the appropriateness and the necessity of the proposed 
experiment to achieve a specific research goal. The first 
evaluates to what extent the expected results are robust, 
reproducible and generalizable and are suitable to 
answer the research question, e.g. choice of best animal 
model, adequate operationalisation, study design and 
compliance with good scientific practice are evaluated. 
The evaluation of the necessity deals with the question if 
the project complies with the 3R principle (replacement, 
reduction, refinement), i.e. animals are only to be used if 
the goal cannot be achieved with non-animal means, or 
with cognitively less developed species, fewer animals 
and/or less harmful procedures.
The goal-related essentiality follows after positive 
evaluation of the instrumental essentiality and is consid-
ered to be a part of the ethical review of project propos-
als. The Directive explicitly defines seven legal purposes 
for the use of animals in science, e.g. basic research, 
translational or applied research, product safety, educa-
tion and training, protection of the environment, preser-
vation of species and forensic inquiries (art. 5 Directive). 
If the project complies with any of these legal purposes 
(art. 38, par. 1, lit. b Directive) it is then subject to a so-
called harm-benefit analysis (HBA) to assess “whether 
the harm to the animals in terms of suffering, pain and 
distress is justified by the expected outcome taking into 
account ethical consideration and may ultimately benefit 
human beings, animals or the environment” (art. 38, 
par. 2, lit. d Directive). 
This means that in case of the Directive the explicitly 
defined legal purposes for the use of animals for scien-
tific purposes and their pertaining interests for humans, 
animals and the environment are weighed against the 
inflicted harm on animals. 
The Swiss Animal Welfare Act stresses the “inherent 
worth of the animal” and experiments are only legally 
admissible if they serve one of the following „legitimate 
interests of society“, e.g. preservation or protection of the 
life and health of human beings or animals; new knowl-
edge concerning fundamental biological processes or 
protection of the natural environment (art. 137 par. 1, lit. 
a–c TSchV). Further it is stated: “If any stress imposed on 
the animal cannot be justified by overriding legitimate 
interests, this constitutes a disregard for the animal’s 
dignity. Stress is deemed to be present in particular if 
pain, suffering or harm is inflicted on the animal, if it 
is exposed to anxiety or humiliation, if there is major 
interference with its appearance or its abilities or if it is 
excessively instrumentalised“ (art. 3, lit. a TSchG). 
This means that in the case of the Swiss Animal 
Welfare Act “legitimate interests of society” (Swiss Acad-
emies of Arts and Sciences 2005) are weighed against 
the harms of the animals and their dignity, which “is not 
duly respected if they are subjected to harms that cannot 
be justified by preponderant interests” (Swiss Academies 
of Arts and Sciences 2005).
Together, this shows that the assessment of the goal-
related essentiality evaluates in both legislations whether 
the goal of the project is important enough to justify 
harms in animals which is only the case if the expected 
benefit outweighs the harms on animals. 
Against this background, it becomes clear that the 
weighing of human interests against animal harms 
requires a clear understanding of harm and benefit and 
how they are to be weighed. What can legally be consid-
ered as harm, depends on the normative framework the 
Directive and the Swiss Animal Welfare Act are based on. 
To this end, we outline the harm concepts the European 
and the Swiss legislation are based on. We examine what 
is considered as harm and (3) elaborate on the moral 
significance that is given to different forms of harm 
within the HBA in these frameworks. (4) Last, we discuss 
potential practical implications of these different norma-
tive frameworks for project evaluation in animal research 
with the practical example of genetically disenhancing 
the ability of rodents to feel pain and to suffer.
Sentientist and non-sentientist harm 
concepts in the European and the Swiss 
regulation
A crucial role in our argumentation plays the distinction 
between sentientist and non-sentientist harms. Here we 
follow Klaus Peter Rippe (2008), who defines sentien-
tist harms as subjective, negatively experienced mental 
states (i.e. “subjective harms”). Importantly, when using 
the word sentientist we do not refer to the moral status 
of a being (e.g. anthropocentrism, sentientism, biocen-
trism), but refer to a specific harm concept. In contrast 
non-sentientist harms include harms that do not cause 
negative subjective experience for the affected individual. 
In general, non-sentientist harm concepts can be found 
in biocentrism, who morally considers all living beings, 
not only sentient beings (e.g. Taylor 1989, Rutgers and 
Heeger 1999). In biocentrism the precondition for harm 
is not sentience, but having a species-specific “good of its 
own”, i.e. this means that every being that can flourish, 
e.g. grow, maintain and reproduce itself, can be harmed. 
Because non-sentient forms of harm are not necessarily 
connected to a subjective, negative experience, they are 
also referred to as “objective harms”. Sentientist harm 
concepts are paradigmatically found in pathocentrism, 
where only sentient beings have a moral status, although 
some pathocentrists also include non-sentientist harms 
as morally relevant (e.g. Regan [2004] 1983, Wolf 2014).
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The EU Directive is predominantly based on consequen-
tialistic moral theory, with a hierarchic pathocentrism. The 
importance of pathocentrism is shown by the fact that 
only sentient beings are protected by the legislation (moral 
status) and its focus on negative subjective experiences of 
animals (e.g. pain, suffering and distress) (Grimm 2015) 
and therefore on a sentientist harm concept.
However, there are at least two exceptions of non-
sentientist forms of harm that are also considered, e.g. 
“prevention from expressing natural behaviour includ-
ing restrictions on the housing, husbandry and care 
standards“ and the “breeding genetically altered animals 
which are expected to have no clinically detectable 
adverse phenotype“ (Annex VIII Directive).
Both mentioned examples are classified as „mild“ 
pain, distress and suffering. Of note, within procedures 
classified as more harmful than „mild“ (e.g. moderate or 
severe) only sentientist forms of harm can be found. This 
shows that although non-sentientist forms of harm are 
considered in the Directive, they only play a minor role 
compared to sentientist forms of harm.
The Swiss Animal Welfare Act also acknowledges that 
sentientisic forms of harm (orig. “Belastungen”) such as 
pain, suffering and anxiety, have to be taken into consid-
eration within a HBA. Importantly, the Swiss TSchG also 
considers non-sentientist harms defined as “major inter-
ference with animal’s appearance or abilities, humiliation 
and excessive instrumentalisation” (Camenzind 2013). 
They are considered non-sentient (or objective harms) 
because they do not lead necessarily to negative subjec-
tive experiences for the individual. Examples include, 
e.g. glowfish (appearance), dehorned cows (appearance 
and abilities) or ridiculing animals with funny costumes 
(humiliation), etc. Below we discuss how important 
these non-sentient forms of harm are for project evalua-
tion within the Swiss regulation.
The moral significance of harm  
within the HBA
So far, we have primarily reflected on a conceptual level 
what is considered to be harm in the Directive and the 
TSchG. In the following we will discuss how much moral 
significance is given to different forms of harm within 
the HBA in the Swiss and EU regulation. 
To understand the difference between sentientist and 
non-sentientist harms in the Swiss regulation, one has 
to relate them to the ethical theory the regulation is 
based on. On the constitutional level the dignity of 
creature (“Würde der Kreatur”) has been incorporated 
in 1992. In Article 120 of the Swiss constitution on non-
human gene technology it is stated that the dignity of all 
living beings has to be taken into account. The dignity 
of creature is a concept with a biocentric view of moral 
status, and as such, it also includes non-sentient beings, 
like plants and other less complex organisms. Against 
this biocentric background on the constitutional level, it 
becomes apparent that harm in the form of “major inter-
ference with its appearance or its abilities”, “humiliation” 
and “excessive instrumentalisation” found in the TSchG 
do not have to be experienced negatively to be legally 
relevant within the HBA and thus, major interference 
with animal’s appearance or abilities, humiliation, and 
excessive instrumentalisation can potentially affect the 
decision-making process in project evaluation. 
Interestingly, only sentient organisms are protected 
by the Animal Welfare Act in Switzerland. However, 
from a philosophical point of view, there is, according 
to biocentrism, no objective standpoint, from which the 
flourishing of one organism can be regarded as being 
more valuable than the flourishing of another organism 
(Taylor 1989) and thus the TSchG has been criticized for 
its exclusion of non-sentient animals (EKAH 2001). 
On the practical level, both regulations are very similar 
in terms of how the evaluation process is operational-
ised, e.g. the evaluation of the instrumental and goal-
related essentiality (HBA). However, due to the differ-
ences regarding their underlying harm concept, i.e. the 
role and significance of non-sentientist, objective forms 
of harm, different harms have to be taken into consider-
ation in the HBA within both regulations. In the follow-
ing we will analyse how the inclusion of non-sentient 
concerns regarding major interference on appearance 
and abilities, humiliation, dignity and excessive instru-
mentalisation can potentially affect project evaluation. To 
illustrate this, we will use the genetic disenhancement of 
rodents (i.e. the genetic reduction of their ability to feel 
pain and to suffer) as practical example.
Implications for project evaluation
The responsibility of carrying out project evaluations lies 
with competent authorities. Competent authorities are 
often supported by ethical review committees whose 
composition can be largely diverse, e.g. various members 
can have a very heterogeneous background and exper-
tise, e.g. scientific research, veterinary/animal welfare, 
NGOs, lay people, etc. (Olsson et al. 2016). Ultimately, 
these committees advise competent authorities to decide 
whether the instrumental and goal-related essentiality 
is met. The principle of legality in constitutional states 
requires authorities to come to decisions on legal ques-
tions in compliance with explicit legal rules (Grimm 
2015). This results in specific responsibilities (i.e. what 
they have to consider) and limitations (i.e. what they 
are not allowed to consider) in their decision-making 
process, i.e. the authorization (or rejection) of research 
proposals must only be based on and is necessarily lim-
ited to the normative framework of the legal regulations, 
e.g. Directive/2010/63/EU (for all EU member states) and 
the Swiss regulation for project evaluation in Switzerland. 
This means that authorities and committees working 
under the EU Directive or Swiss regulation are to interpret 
„ethical considerations“, “harm”, “overriding interests” 
and “excessive instrumentalisation”, respectively with 
regards to implicit and explicit normative criteria their 
legal regulations are based on. To illustrate the importance 
of this for project evaluation, we will now discuss how 
the different normative frameworks can potentially affect 
project evaluation. To this end, we will use the genetic 
disenhancement of rodents to reduce their ability to feel 
pain and to suffer as a practical example.  
Genetic Disenhancement of rodents
The Directive acknowledges the “intrinsic value” of ani-
mals and is concerned with animal suffering and thus 
it requires procedures to be performed with the least 
possible suffering. In order to minimize animal suffering, 
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different strategies have been pursued. Paul Thompson 
coined the term “animal disenhancement” for alterations 
of animals to better suit their environment (Thomp-
son 2008, D’eath et al. 2010). Recent progress in pain 
research (i.e. unpleasant sensory experience [sensation], 
which leads to physiological changes and/or behavioural 
responses designed to escape or avoid the negative 
experience [Federal Food Safety and Veterinary Office 
2017]) could show that pain can be divided into two 
distinct dimensions that correlate to activity in differ-
ent brain regions (Farah 2009, Price 2000, Rainville et 
al. 1997). On the one hand, the sensory dimension of 
pain is associated with the primary and somatosen-
sory cortex and constitutes the quality of the pain (i.e. 
constitutes the localisation, intensity and duration of 
pain), its localisation and intensity. On the other hand, 
the affective dimension of pain is associated with the 
anterior cingulate cortex and the insula cortex. Several 
studies show that this area is relevant for the negative 
perception of pain, i.e. how the pain is recognised, how 
much one minds the pain or how unpleasant the pain is 
(Farah 2009, Rose 2002, Shriver 2006). Importantly, it has 
been demonstrated that one can genetically modify the 
affective dimension of pain independently of the sen-
sory dimension (Rainville et al. 1997). This means that 
it might be possible to genetically reduce the affective 
(subjective and painful) dimension of pain (Shriver 2009) 
and/or chronic pain symptoms, while leaving the acute 
pain response intact (Wei et al. 2002).
The recent advances in gene editing and the under-
standing of the molecular processes underlying pain 
physiology, might provide a way to potentially geneti-
cally reduce or eliminate research animal’s ability to feel 
pain (as something negative) (Shriver 2009, Price 2000, 
Rainville et al. 1997).
Rodents are the most used species in animal research 
(Anonymous 2008, Taylor et al. 2008), and relatively 
easy to genetically manipulate. Assuming (specula-
tively) that it might be possible to genetically eliminate 
research animal’s ability to feel pain, and assuming 
that genetically disenhanced animals behave “normal” 
compared to their genetically unaltered counterparts, 
the suffering of millions of research animals every year 
could be reduced. 
Prima facie, the reduction of pain and suffering (sen-
tient, subjective harm) would be a strong argument in 
favour of genetic disenhancement within a sentientist 
and consequentialist framework. But is it that simple? In 
the remainder of this paper, we will evaluate the impli-
cations of our thought experiment for project evaluation 
within the framework of the Directive and the Swiss 
Animal Welfare Act.
Implications for project evaluation within  
the EU Directive
Within the EU Directive harms have to be weighed 
against potential benefits “taking ethical considera-
tions” into account. When doing so, authorities are 
only allowed to base their decision on arguments that 
are compliant with consequentialist moral theory that 
includes a hierarchical pathocentrism based on anthro-
porelational criteria (explained above). 
Under the assumption that pain and suffering would 
be reduced, genetic disenhancement seems, prima facie, 
to be in compliance with “refine” of the 3Rs, without 
necessarily affecting the number of animals (reduce) 
and/or the species used (replace). Also, since the amount 
of harm that needs to be outweighed is greatly reduced 
it should dramatically facilitate the HBA (goal-related 
essentiality). Thus, from the normative standpoint of the 
European Directive there seems to be no objection to the 
practice of genetically disenhancing rodents in principle. 
But secondary factors may also have to be taken into 
consideration.
However, a plethora of objections have been raised 
against genetic disenhancement. Opponents have raised 
the concern that from a practical perspective the unpre-
dictability of the concrete effects of the genetic manipu-
lation are relevant (Ferrari 2012, Macer 1989). Pain is 
a complex phenomenon with many dimensions, e.g. 
physical, sensory, behavioural, emotional, cognitive. It 
remains to be examined, how pain elimination affects 
the organism as whole, e.g. perception of positive expe-
riences, animal health or empathy. Rodents are social 
animals and thus it should be taken into consideration 
that the elimination of the affective pain dimension 
could potentially influence the social behaviour of the 
animals, e.g. emotional contagion or conciliation behav-
iour (Bekoff and Pierce 2009). Depending on how the 
social behaviour is affected, this could represent sentient 
as well as non-sentient harm, e.g. negative effects on 
the caring behaviour of a mother towards her offspring 
would represent a sentient harm, if the mother does 
not care for the offspring anymore. At the same time 
this could lead to non-sentient form of harm due to the 
negative effect on species-specific behaviour. However, 
this is a speculative claim, which due to a lack of empiri-
cal data, is difficult to prove. The actual consequences of 
genetic disenhancement can only be analysed within a 
retrospective evaluation. 
Another objection might be that erasing an animal’s 
ability to feel pain and to suffer turns a sentient being 
into a non-sentient being, which would potentially be 
against the requirement of the Directive that “animals 
should always be treated as sentient creatures” (recital 
12, Directive). However, we do not think that the inabil-
ity to feel pain and suffering means that animals can no 
longer have other emotions, i.e. even if the ability to feel 
pain and to suffer is missing, animals would still be able 
to experience positive emotions and thus, would still be 
sentient beings, although it is not known yet how pain 
elimination affects other sensations. In case the genetic 
disenhancement would in fact turn animals into non-
sentient beings, the regulations of the Directive would 
no longer apply to them. 
Most of these objections concern sentientist forms of 
harm. As we have explained above, objective harms are 
also part of the Directive but only play a minor role (e.g. 
“prevention from expressing natural behaviour including 
restrictions on the housing, husbandry and care stand-
ards“ and “breeding genetically altered animals which 
are expected to have no clinically detectable adverse 
phenotype“ [Annex VIII, Directive] are classified as mild 
harms). 
Based on the above, it seems, prima facie, that within 
the normative framework of the Directive, mild (objec-
tive) and unknown and hypothetical (subjective) harms 
potentially generated by genetic disenhancement would 
probably be outweighed (in a HBA) by the reduction 
of obvious and certain (subjective) pain, suffering and 
distress (caused by experiments), which are considered 
more important in the Directive. 
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Thus, with regards to the European Directive (and 
within a sentientist and consequentialistic point of view), 
prima facie, there seems to be no strong objections to 
genetic disenhancement of rodents.
Implications for project evaluation within  
the Swiss regulation
As we have seen, genetic modifications of research ani-
mals are a polarizing topic and controversially discussed. 
The Swiss legislation with its inclusion of animal’s dig-
nity and the importance given to non-sentientist forms 
of harm within that framework might to some extent 
provide an answer as to why this is the case.
In the following we will discuss whether the non-sen-
tientist harms and their significance given to in the Swiss 
regulation (e.g. major interference with the appear-
ance or abilities of animals, humiliation and excessive 
instrumentalisation and the concept of animal dignity) 
(Camenzind 2013, art. 3 TSchG), allow for other objec-
tions (compared to the Directive) to be considered in 
project evaluation. 
The purpose of the TSchG (art. 1) is to protect the 
dignity and welfare of animals. This means that the 
well-being of animals is not limited to sentientist forms 
of harm, but it also includes a non-sentientist harm 
dimension, which is explicitly mentioned in article 3 of 
the Swiss Animal Welfare Act: 
„[...] If any stress imposed on the animal cannot be 
justified by overriding interests, this constitutes a dis-
regard for the animal’s dignity. Stress is deemed to be 
present in particular if pain, suffering or harm is inflicted 
on the animal, if it is exposed to anxiety or humiliation, 
if there is major interference with its appearance or its 
abilities or if it is excessively instrumentalised“.
In the case of genetically erasing the animal’s ability 
to feel pain and to suffer the appearance of the animal is 
not changed. However, genetic disenhancement repre-
sents a major interference with animal’s abilities, defined 
as a long-term or irreversible alteration of species-
specific capacities or biological functions (Federal Food 
Safety and Veterinary Office [FSVO] 2017). Also, accord-
ing to TSchG the “species-appropriate behaviour within 
the limits of their biological adaptability“ is important for 
their well-being (art. 3 lit. b, par. 2 TSchG). This raises the 
concern, how genetic disenhancement interferes with 
species-appropriate behaviour (see above par. 5.1).
“Humiliation” (Bolliger 2016) is usually understood 
as ridiculing an animal (e.g. by dressing animals up in 
costumes or demanding submissive behaviour), which 
in the case of genetic disenhancement is not the case.
“Instrumentalisation” can be understood as a “four 
element” relation: someone (agent) uses an entity 
(means) in a specific way (mode) for a particular purpose 
(Camenzind 2019). Regarding animal experimentation 
in general and animal disenhancement in particular it is 
obvious that animals are instrumentalised by research-
ers. Animals are bred to function as model animal in 
research, e.g. to generate knowledge, drugs, therapies, 
etc. According to the TSchG different modes of instru-
mentalisation can be distinguished. To instrumentalise 
animals moderately is legally permitted, e.g. studying the 
behaviour of wild animals. In contrast, excessive instru-
mentalisation refers to modes of instrumentalisation, 
which possess a certain quality, intensity or duration 
that require a justification, i.e. this means that the action 
as such is not necessarily impermissible, but it requires 
specific legally permitted benefits to be at stake to justify 
the excessive instrumentalisation, e.g. a demonstration 
in a HBA that the “stress imposed on the animal“ can be 
„justified by overriding interests“ (see below).
What it means to instrumentalise an animal exces-
sively can be explained on a value related dimension 
and on a content related dimension. The value dimen-
sion refers to a disrespectful attitude of the agent, while 
the content dimension refers to a disrespectful action 
(Hauskeller 2007). Since the dignity of animals is based 
on their inherent worth, animals are instrumentalised 
excessively, if their inherent worth is not recognized, not 
respected or if the necessary condition of their good of 
their own is eradicated. This is the case, if animals are 
reduced to their aesthetic, social or instrumental value, 
and therefore merely or excessively to their usefulness 
for someone. 
This explanation on the value related dimension is 
not yet sufficient to analyse if animal disenhancement 
instrumentalises animals excessively – it only provides 
an explanation on a formal level, why certain actions 
require moral and legal justification. Therefore, the con-
ceptual value dimension has to be translated to the 
practical content related dimension and the animal’s 
flourishing. On the content related dimension, the con-
text of the action, in our case the disenhancement, is also 
important. As already mentioned disenhanced animals 
are bred to serve human beings as research models etc., 
which infringes the animal’s flourishing. Also, animals 
are kept in captivity and most animal experiments result 
in the death of the animal. Hence, their flourishing is 
restricted and prematurely terminated by force and thus, 
the animals’ good of their own is not respected properly. 
The infringement on the animals’ flourishing caused by 
their captivity and their premature death has to be justi-
fied by overriding interests. 
Because pain and suffering are negative experiences, 
it seems morally desirable from a sentientist perspec-
tive to avoid animal pain and suffering. However, from 
a perspective that is concerned with animal flourish-
ing (beyond negative subjective experiences) the reduc-
tion of pain sensitivity might only be morally relevant, 
if it negatively affects animal flourishing. Importantly, 
although pain is a negative experience, this does not 
mean that pain only has negative effects on flourish-
ing (Melzack 1996, 11f.). Pain also has a survival func-
tion since pain occurs before a serious injury happens 
(e.g. hand on a hot stove). Also, painful experiences 
prevent further injuries by learning to avoid dangerous 
objects or situations, and pain limits activities to recover 
more rapidly. The elimination of pain thus eliminates an 
important physiological mechanism to cope with differ-
ent threats and to guarantee flourishing. 
Interestingly, studies have shown that eliminating the 
affective pain dimension can leave acute pain features 
and acute responses to noxious stimuli intact (Shriver 
2009). Thus, animals are likely to still exhibit normal 
guarding behaviour (i.e. behaviour aimed at avoiding 
pain), making an increase in self-injuries unlikely. 
To summarize, genetic disenhancement represents 
an excessive instrumentalisation of animals because it 
infringes with animal flourishing.
However, as already mentioned above, the peculiarity 
of the Swiss dignity concept is, that even if the dignity 
of an animal is negatively affected, i.e. due to non-sen-
tientist harms such as major interference with animal’s 
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abilities and excessive instrumentalisation, they can be 
legally justified within an HBA. If the legally legitimate 
interests of society outweigh the inflicted harms on 
animals then the dignity of animals is still regarded 
and thus the project legally permitted. If the involved 
harms ca not be justified by overriding interests, animal 
dignity is disregarded and the project would need to be 
rejected.
Conclusion
We have compared the normative framework of Direc-
tive 2010/63/EU and the Swiss regulation with regards 
to project evaluation in animal research. We have 
explained that committee members are bound to the 
principle of legality, i.e. committee members are lim-
ited in their decision-making by the boundaries of the 
law. In the case of Directive 2010/63/EU this means 
that committees, when “taking ethical consideration” 
into account in their evaluation of the goal-related 
essentiality of project proposals, are almost exclusively 
allowed to base their decision on a sentientist harm 
concept and consequentialistic moral theory. Within 
this framework, harm is primarily understood as sen-
tientist forms of harm, i.e. pain, suffering and distress 
experienced as negative subjective sensations, while 
non-sentientist (objective) forms of harm, which do not 
lead to negative subjective experiences for the animal 
only play a minor role. 
Authorities working under the Swiss regulation are 
required to base their decision on a biocentric normative 
framework. The Swiss regulation considers the same sen-
tient forms of harm as the Directive, while it also includes 
and gives significant importance to non-sentient forms 
of harm, e.g. major interference with the appearance and 
the abilities of animals and excessive instrumentalisation 
in project evaluation. The conceptual differences underly-
ing the respective harm concepts of the regulations have 
important practical implications for project evaluation 
– while projects within the EU framework (almost exclu-
sively) have to demonstrate in a HBA that the sentientist 
(subjective) harm on animals is outweighed, projects in 
Switzerland also need to be able to demonstrate that their 
potential benefits can outweigh not only the sentientist 
but also the non-sentientist harms on animals. 
Since sentientist forms of harm would be greatly 
reduced by genetic disenhancement, we have come to 
the conclusion that regarding the harm framework of 
the Directive there are, prima facie, no strong objections 
to such actions. For the Swiss regulation, we conclude 
that genetic disenhancement represents an excessive 
instrumentalisation and a major intervention in the 
abilities of the animal. However, these non-sentientist 
forms of harm can potentially be justified if other over-
riding interests outweigh these forms of stress within 
a HBA.The analysis provided shows that genetic dis-
enhancement requires justification by HBA in both 
frameworks. While the Directive almost exclusively 
regards sentientist forms of harm the inclusion (and the 
moral significance given) to non-sentientist forms of 
harm such as excessive instrumentalisation and major 
interference with appearance and abilities and violation 
of dignity found in the Swiss regulation considerably 
raise the bar for a positive project evaluation compared 
to the EU Directive.
Discussion and outlook
In this paper, we evaluated whether genetic disen-
hancement complies with the Swiss and EU regula-
tions, focusing our argumentation on the evaluation of 
the different harm concepts these regulations are based 
on. Besides passing a harm-benefit analysis, research-
ers in their project proposals also need to demonstrate 
that their goal falls under a legal purpose for the use of 
animals for scientific purposes, i.e. it needs to be evalu-
ated whether genetic disenhancement with the goal of 
“refinement” is a legally legitimate interest as stated 
in article 8 (par. 2, lit. a–e) of the Federal Act on Non-
Human Gene Technology (Anonymous 2018) and arti-
cle 5 of the Directive (Anonymous 2013), respectively. 
The “legitimate interests of society” within the Swiss 
regulation include human and animal health; guaran-
teeing food security, the reduction of harm caused to 
the environment, the preservation and improvement of 
environmental conditions, securing a substantial eco-
nomic, social or environmental benefit for society and 
increasing knowledge and the interests. And further 
article 9 of the Federal Act on Non-Human Gene 
Technology (Anonymous 2018) states, that “genetically 
modified vertebrates may only be produced and put into 
circulation for purposes of research, therapy, or diag-
nostics in human or veterinary medicine”. The Direc-
tive states seven legal purposes for the use of animal 
in research, e.g. basic research, translational or applied 
research, product safety, education and training, protec-
tion of the environment, preservation of species and 
forensic inquiries (art. 5 Directive). Based on these legal 
interests and legal purposes it is, at least not prima facie, 
clear that “refinement” for refinement’s sake is a legally 
sufficient purpose for the use of animals in research for 
the Directive and within the Swiss legal framework. This 
is also demonstrated by a recent case in Switzerland, 
where a project proposal at the Swiss Federal Institute 
of Technology (ETH) in Zurich with the goal to quantify 
the stress levels of zebra finches due to head-fixing 
was rejected on the basis that studies solely aimed at 
improving future studies were unwarranted (Anony-
mous 2019). This ruling, at least so far, seems to be an 
exception, but it indicates that the decision on whether 
“refinement” is a legal purpose is not clear-cut.
Notwithstanding that genetic disenhancement of 
research animals might be admissible within both the 
EU Directive and the Swiss regulation, there are impor-
tant conceptual differences regarding the harm concept 
between these normative frameworks. That these con-
ceptual differences might indeed have practical implica-
tions is (at least) indicated in the following two court 
decisions. First, in Bremen, Germany, in 2012 a court 
decision rejected to renew Andreas Kreiter’s licence to 
work on macaques because his work was „too far from 
application“ (Abbott 2010) and because “it is ethically not 
justifiable to inflict this kind of pain on animals for the 
generation of neurobiological basic knowledge” (Anony-
mous 2012). After a long legal dispute, however, the 
decision was successfully appealed by Kreiter at the high-
est court in Germany (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) (Anony-
mous 2014). The court ruled that the “licensing authority 
does not have discretion in its decision” and that „the 
burden on the experimental animals (rhesus monkeys) 
is ethical in view of the high scientific significance of the 
project” (Anonymous 2014, translation of ours).
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A similar case happened in 2006 when the authorities 
in Zurich declined to renew Kevan Martin’s licence for 
primate work (Abbott 2010). The authorities ruled that 
Martin’s work offended the dignity of the animals and 
would not generate practical benefits in the foreseeable 
future. Unlike in Germany, Switzerland’s Supreme Court 
upheld the decision (Abbott 2010). The fact that the 
court in its verdict explicitly referred to the dignity of the 
animals implies that the non-sentient concepts of harm, 
in practice, can play an important role in project evalua-
tion in Switzerland.
We have mentioned that veterinarians in their role 
as members of ethical review committees, as animal 
welfare officers, or experimenters are legally required to 
comply with legal animal research regulations, that are 
based on different harm concepts (sentientist vs. non-
sentientist harms). 
However, the field of veterinary practice includes a 
wide variety of different contexts, such as companion 
animals, small animal clinic, agriculture, conservation 
medicine, wildlife management or public health, whose 
practices are also based on different legal and theoretical 
frameworks e.g. regarding animal welfare, animal suf-
fering, moral significance of animals, but also harm con-
cepts. The importance of non-sentient harms become 
apparent in the discussion whether veterinarians should 
apply artificial insemination of British bulldogs because 
of extreme breed characteristics (they cannot reproduce 
independently which some consider a harm) or in the 
critique on dehorning cows, which by opponents is 
considered a major interference with the appearance of 
the animal. 
The different moral significance given to animals and 
sentientist and non-sentientist harm in different con-
texts demonstrates how multi-layered, complex, diverse 
and unstable veterinary practice (and ethics in veteri-
nary practice) in different contexts is. In light of this it 
becomes evident that conceptual clarity regarding the 
roles and responsibilities within a specific given context 
represents a key challenge for veterinary profession and 
professional ethics in veterinary practice. The elaboration 
and clarification on the normative frameworks of the 
legal regulations of animal research in Switzerland and 
the EU and the specific roles and responsibilities that 
follow from them should help veterinarians with regards 
to better understanding veterinary professional ethics 
and context-sensitive roles and responsibilities in veteri-
nary practice. Conceptual and terminological clarity do 
not solve the diverse moral dilemmas veterinarians are 
facing. However, they provide a better understanding of 
different sources of moral conflicts and act as a tool to 
cope with them, thus hopefully helping to reduce moral 
distress in veterinarians.
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